Im ersten Buch des Convivio erläutert und verteidigt Dante sein Vorhaben. Es bietet den Zugang zu den nachfolgenden drei Büchern, in denen er zur inhaltlichen Vorstellung seiner Philosophie fortschreitet.

Taking Aquinas's metaphysics of human nature as my point of departure and taking inspiration from Dante's concept of transhumanization, I sketch a metaphysics of the afterlife according to which a human person in the interim phase between death and resurrection is not a mere disembodied soul. I offer some theological reasons for thinking that our bodily human nature is essential to what we are and for thinking that we can survive the destruction of our bodies at death. I argue (...) that these claims are consistent, provided we hold that our bodily human nature, while essential to what we are, is not necessary to what we are. I argue for this distinction between essence and necessity. I then raise a mereological puzzle about the relation between a disembodied soul and the person whose soul it is, and argue that, if we are to avoid the Cartesian conclusion that this relation is identity, we must hold that a human person, even in the interim phase, is composed of a soul and something else. Drawing on Dante's concept of transhumanization, I argue that this something else is God himself or some specially created divine grace or energy. (shrink)

When political theorists teach the history of political philosophy, they typically skip from the ancient Greeks and Cicero to Augustine in the fifth century and Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth, and then on to the origins of modernity with Machiavelli and beyond. Paul Stern aims to change this settled narrative and makes a powerful case for treating Dante Alighieri, arguably the greatest poet of medieval Christendom, as a political philosopher of the first rank. In Dante's Philosophical (...) Life, Stern argues that Purgatorio's depiction of the ascent to Earthly Paradise, that is, the summit of Mount Purgatory, was intended to give instruction on how to live the philosophic life, understood in its classical form as "love of wisdom." As an object of love, however, wisdom must be sought by the human soul, rather than possessed. But before the search can be undertaken, the soul needs to consider from where it begins: its nature and its good. In Stern's interpretation of Purgatorio, Dante's intense concern for political life follows from this need, for it is law that supplies the notions of good that shape the soul's understanding and it is law, especially its limits, that provides the most evident display of the soul's enduring hopes. According to Stern, Dante places inquiry regarding human nature and its good at the heart of philosophic investigation, thereby rehabilitating the highest form of reasoned judgment or prudence. Philosophy thus understood is neither a body of doctrines easily situated in a Christian framework nor a set of intellectual tools best used for predetermined theological ends, but a way of life. Stern's claim that Dante was arguing for prudence against dogmatisms of every kind addresses a question of contemporary concern: whether reason can guide a life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 167 they regard as the Standard of every Thing, and which they will not submit to the superior Light of Revelation?" (p. 21) is the Hume we have come to accept, Hume the philosopher, Hume the foe of superstition and enthusiasm. Indeed, upon reading the Letter it seems that one must ask himself if Hume;s desire for this position--and the financial security it would offer--has not (...) affected his response. We know that in his later life Hume flatly refused to debate the multitude of clergymen who attacked his works. Not even so respectable a philosopher as Thomas Reid could elicit a public response from him. Why then did he reply to a philosophical scoundrel such as Wishart? Of course, one could suggest that Courts and Kames and perhaps others may have urged Hume to this reply in his own interest. But that, to me, is precisely the point: Why so unusual a concern in just this case, and why one which seems to undercut some of what are thought to be Hume's most daring and creative analyses? These are not rhetorical questions, but queries of importance to those who wish to see Hume and his work whole. The Letter ]rom a Gentleman does shed important light on the Treatise. Professor Mossner was quite correct in his surmise. But I believe that it raises more questions than it answers--and for this reason too we are fortunate that it has been added to the Hume bibliography. DAVZDFATE NORTON Edinburgh, Scotland THE HEGELIAN DANTE OF WILLIAM TORREY HARRIS William Torrey Harris is remembered as the foremost American exponent of Hegelianism; as founder of the Philosophical Society (1866); as editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1867-93); as U.S. Commissioner of Education (1889-1906); and as founder, with Miss Susan E. Blow, of the first permanent public school kindergarten in America. He also gave Melville Dewey the order of the ten subiect classes of his famous book classification system, and was co-founder of the Library Journal. Harris was born in North Killingsly, Connecticut in 1835. He studied at Phillips Andovcr Academy, and at Yale University, from which he withdrew in his junior year to accept a teaching position in St. Louis, Missouri in 1857. In St. Louis he met Henry C. Brockmeyer, a German immigrant and intellectual, and under his influence began a lifelong commitment to the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. He states that Hegel's philosophy became the center of all his thinking, but he nevertheless ~vent on to study the works of the other great thinkers, including those of Dante Alighieri. In 1883-84 he gave a series of lectures in St. Louis on Dante, and again in 1886 at the Concord School of Philosophy. These lectures were later expanded and published as The Spiritual Sense o] Dante's Divina Commedia, in Boston, by Houghton in 1889, and reissued in 1896. 168 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The form of the Divina Commedia is a massive triadic structure of written words developed by exhaustive repetition of the terza rima. Structurally it is a development of the concept of The Trinity. The reader who knew not a single word of Italian could not escape having the Trinitarian notion hammered into his consciousness. Harris, however, was more concerned with meaning than form, and so he considered the triadic format a relatively trivial matter. Harris uses the Commedia to illustrate by imaginative representation the dialectic of the Holy Trinity to the American Protestant while explaining it with Hegelian logic. In summary he writes, "The doctrine of the divine form, or the self-activity of the absolute, involves the common nature of man and God, or God as divine human. This is the great central truth (of which the doctrine of the Trinity is the symbol) on which all modern civilization is built, and it is its open secret." Dante's Inferno corresponds with Hegel's logical and ontological level, called "Sein," the realm of abstract-unconscious-being-for-another. The Purgatory corresponds with his level "Wesen," the realm of mediated being in which the self is conscious of its being-in-and-for-another... (shrink)

This essay is an examination of Dante Alighieri as a spiritual theologian of grace. Using Cantos 9 and 29–30 of the Purgatorio the essay shows that Dante constructs his other-worldly journey as one that is grace-filled and dependent on the grace bestowed through the church's sacraments, in concert with Thomas Aquinas’ theology of grace. Further, in light of the creation of the Feast of Corpus Christi in the thirteenth century, the essay offers a unique interpretation of (...) the figure of Beatrice, showing that she, at least within the context of Purgatorio 29–30, is divine grace. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Dante's Convivio, composed in exile between 1304 and 1307, is a series of self-commentaries on three of Dante's long poems. These allegorical love poems and philosophical verse become the basis for philosophical, literary, moral, and political exposition. The prose is written in Italian so that those who were not educated in Latin could take part in what Dante called his 'banquet of knowledge'. In this edition, eminent Dante translator-scholar Andrew Frisardi offers the first fully annotated translation (...) of the work into English, with an extensive introduction, making Dante's often complex writings accessible to scholars and students. The parallel Italian text is also included for the first time in an English translation of the Convivio. Readers of this work can gain a strong understanding of the philosophical themes across Dante's work, including the Divine Comedy, as well as the logic, politics and science of his time. (shrink)

In dieser Schrift begründet Dante die Priorität der Volks- und Muttersprache vor der lateinischen Gelehrtensprache und fordert eine italienische Hochsprache. Er untermauert seine Ausführungen durch eine anthropologische Erörterung der menschlichen Sprachfähigkeit. Dank einer originellen Interpretation des biblischen Mythos vom Turmbau von Babel legt er eine vernünftig begründete Neubewertung der Vielfalt und der historischen Entwicklung der Sprachen vor. Das Problem der Sprache stellt sich im Denken Dantes in zweifacher Weise: als Problem der Sprache der Philosophie und unter dem Gesichtspunkt der (...) Philosophie der Sprache. In "De vulgari eloquentia" bietet Dante ein ganzes Arsenal metaphysischer Paradigmen auf, um der sprachlichen Verständigung der Menschen eine unvordenkliche Dignität zu geben. Er stellt die gesamte Philosophie in den Dienst des Menschen als sprechendes Wesen. Auch wenn Dante die Doppelbestimmung der Sprache als sinnliches Zeichen, das den Gedanken des einen Menschen einem andern zu vermitteln fähig ist, von der Tradition übernimmt, setzt er andere Akzente. Die Sprache der Menschen ist nicht nur eine im Vergleich zur Transparenz der reinen Geister unvollkommenere Form der Kommunikation, sondern sie wird positiv als die dem Menschen gänzlich angemessene und entsprechende Form der Kommunikation interpretiert: Das Sprechen ist der "herausragende Akt des menschlichen Geschlechts". Mit dem Erscheinen von "De vulgari eloquentia" liegt die vierbändige Ausgabe der Philosophischen Werke Dante Alighieris vollständig vor. Bislang erschienen Bd. 1: Das Schreiben an Cangrande (PhB 463) Bd. 2: Disputation über das Wasser und die Erde (PhB 464) Bd. 4: Das Gastmahl I-IV (PhB 466a-d). (shrink)

Vita Nuova is the first of Dante's major writings. It is a supreme work of love; thirty-one poems are linked by a lyrical prose narrative poem celebrating and debating the subject of love. In the opening chapter Dante sets himself the task of giving meaning to the poetry which he composed and the events which took place after his meeting with Beatrice and the `Lord of Love'. The `new life' which this meeting inspired is the subject of (...) class='Hi'>Dante's most profound creation, which has been read variously as biography, religious allegory, and a meditation on poetry itself. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

In der Beantwortung der für das geozentrische Weltbild aristotelisch-ptolemäischer Prägung zentralen Frage, welches der Elemente höher liege, legt Dante in gut scholastischer Argumentationsweise seine kosmologischen Auffassungen dar. In der ausführlichen Einleitung wird die Naturphilosophie Dantes in ihren historischen Kontext eingebunden und bewertet.

In seinem Schreiben an den Fürsten Cangrande behandelt Dante literaturhistorisch relevante Fragen, wie z. B. jene nach den Bedeutungsebenen seiner "Commedia". In den Ausführungen zur Frage nach der gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit von Sein und Wesen oder bei der Erklärung des zehnten Himmels, dem sog. Empyreum, legt Dante zudem auch in philosophischen und theologischen Fragekomplexen eigenständige Antworten vor.

Článek se zaměřuje na některé aspekty Dantova spisu De monarchia, především na povahu Alighieriho realizace ideje celosvětové monarchie, jež je jedinou zárukou trvalého míru, který je představen jako nezbytný předpoklad plné realizace všech duchovních potencí lidského rodu jako takového. Ačkoliv Dantovy názory vykazují ovlivnění dobovým averroismem, opírá se ve filosofické argumentaci pro upřednostnění vlády jediného celosvětového vladaře o scholasticky interpretovanou aristotelskou metafyziku. Autor konfrontuje základní momenty Dantovy politické filosofie s názory Marsilia z Padovy a především s koncepcemi Tomáše Akvinského. Ačkoliv (...) Dante přispěl k posílení autonomie světského a vymanění se panovnické moci z nároků, jež si osobovalo dobové papežství, vytvořilo jeho zbožštění panovnické moci ideové předpoklady pro zbožštění státu a novodobý etatismus. The study focuses on aspects of Dante`s De monarchia — particularly on Alighieri`s conception of realization of the idea of universal monarchy as the only guarantee of permanent peace. This is presented as a necessary precondition for a full realization of all spiritual potentialities of the human kind as such. Although Dante`s views display an influence of contemporary Averroism, his philosophical argumentation in favour of the rule of one universal monarch is based on scholastic interpretations of Aristotelian metaphysics. Key moments of Dante`s philosophy are confronted with the views of Marsilius of Padua and, particularly, with the conceptions of Thomas Aquinas. It is then argued that Dante contributed to strengthening of the autonomy of the secular order and to liberation of monarchic rule from power claims of the contemporary papacy. At the same time, however, his deification of monarchic rule created preconditions for deification of the state and modern etatism. (shrink)

Thema des Bandes ist die Averroes-Rezeption im Okzident: Es handelt sich dabei um die spezielle Verbreitung von Wissen und Ideen aus dem islamischen Raum in Europa um 1250. Die für ein Verständnis der Gegenwart brandaktuelle These lautet, dass eine vom Averroismus gestaltete Aristotelik das lateinische Christentum prägte. Ein Einfluss, der auf Entwicklungen wirkte, die in Renaissance und Frühkapitalismus gipfelten. Daran knüpft die Frage: War dieser Transfer für modernes Denken konstituierend? These ist auch, dass die Wende hin zu wissenschaftlicher Autonomie ohne (...) Averroismus so nicht hätte erfolgen können. Untersucht wird dies an Hand von fünf Denkern: Thomas von Aquin, Boethius von Dacien (samt einer Gruppe von "lateinischen" Averroisten), Meister Eckhart, Marsilius von Padua sowie Dante Alighieri. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the analysis of the “relationships” between philosophy and theology in Dante's works and, on the example of his work, the influence of ancient philosophy on medieval theology. The medieval theocratic tendencies, which were connected with the inheritance of St. Augustine and finally formed in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, can be interpreted in Dante's era as short-lived phenomena and dependent on the personal preferences of the Roman popes. In search of the purpose (...) of earthly existence, Dante immerses himself in the study of human nature. His reflections bear the stamp of long and painful experiences for the fate of his homeland, which was engulfed in civil strife. Dante undertakes to consider the ways that would allow the realization of human unity, that is, he sets out on the path of existential interpretation of man.The relevance of the study is determined by the problematic of the work itself, which examines the question of the individual's search for the path leading to the Truth, moral criteria that define human life and man as a being. In the “Divine Comedy” Dante Alighieri combined medieval scientific knowledge, ancient philosophy, elements of the worldview of Eastern philosophical schools, religious teachings of the Catholic Church, world and national history. Such a multitude of connected faces makes the poem difficult for a modern person to understand. The analysis of philosophical teachings found in Dante's works makes it possible to understand the dynamics of philosophical thought and to propose possible solutions to modern problems.The purpose of the article is to investigate the intellectual biography of an individual person, as well as philosophical-theological-literary thought in its historical development. The methodology of obtaining new knowledge is based on the comparative research method. (shrink)

continent. 2.2 (2012): 76–81 Comments on Eugene Thacker’s “Cosmic Pessimism” Nicola Masciandaro Anything you look forward to will destroy you, as it already has. —Vernon Howard In pessimism, the first axiom is a long, low, funereal sigh. The cosmicity of the sigh resides in its profound negative singularity. Moving via endless auto-releasement, it achieves the remote. “ Oltre la spera che piú larga gira / passa ’l sospiro ch’esce del mio core ” [Beyond the sphere that circles widest / penetrates (...) the sigh that issues from my heart]. 1 The axiomatic sigh of the pessimist is in a way the pure word of philosophy, a thought that thinks without you, speaks where you are not. The live pneumatic form of the soul’s eventual exit from the dead body’s mouth, the sigh restores consciousness to the funeral of being, to the passing away that is existence. Pessimism speaks in piercing aphorisms because first it sighs. “Beyond the sphere passeth the arrow of our sigh. Hafiz! Silence.” 2 … pessimism is guilty of that most inexcusable of Occidental crimes—the crime of not pretending it’s for real. To the pessimist, the ‘real’ world—the world on whose behalf we are expected to wake up in the morning—is a ceaseless index of its own unreality. The pessimist’s day is not an illumined space for the advancement of experience and action, but a permanently and inescapably reflective zone, the vast interior of a mirror where each thing is only insofar as it is, at best, a false image of itself. Within this speculative situation, inside the doubleness of the mirror, pessimism splits into two paths, false and true, one that tries to fix pessimism (establish a relation with the mirror) and decides in favor of the apparent real, and another that totally falls for pessimism (enters the mirror) and communes with the greater reality of the unreal. These two paths are distinguished by their relation to pessimism’s guilt vis-à-vis the world’s reality-project. The first form, that which remains pessimism for the world and puts on a smiling face, stays guilty to itself (i.e. unconscious) and thus turns hypocritical, becoming at once the pessimism of the commoner who really just wants things to be better for himself and the pessimism of the elite who wants to critically refashion reality in his own image. The general form of this worldly, hypocritical pessimism is the impulse to ‘make the world a better place’, which is the global mask under which the world is diurnally made worse. The second form, that which follows pessimism away from the world and ceases to put on a smiling face, refuses guiltiness as itself theessential Occidental mode of pretense and turns honest, becoming at once the intelligent pessimism required of all ordinary action and the radical pessimism necessary for self-knowledge: seeing that no one is capable of doing good. The general form of this universal, honest pessimism is the impulse not to worry, to give up and embrace dereliction, which is the only real way the world is actually improved. Where worldly pessimism is the engine productive of interminably warring secular and sacred religions (good-projects), universal pessimism strives hopelessly for the paradise of a supremely instantiated pessimus: things are getting so bad that there is no longer any time for them to get worse; things are so constantly-instantly worst that this is BEST. Cosmic pessimism is the mode of universal pessimism which can yet discourse with the world, which has not chosen silence and can spread the inconceivably BAD NEWS in an orderly form ( kosmos ) that the world can understand (if it wanted to). … the result of a confusion between the world and a statement about the world. That is what the world is (the result of a confusion between the world and a statement about the world). … a generalized misanthropy without the anthropos. Pessimism crystallizes around this futility—it is its amor fati , rendered as musical form. Pessimism’s love of fate is a blind love, a love of the blindness of being human in a cosmos conceived around the human’s eclipse, a heavy levitation in the contradictory space between the inescapability of its having been and the impossibility of its will-be. Pessimism’s song of futility is a sensible way of loving fate, with a minimum of eros, by means of a kind of matrimonial love of the fatal. As music, pessimism stays open to the irreparable and the inexorable without the binding of affirmation, in the apparent absence of the radical, infinitely surplus will that absolute amor fati seems to require. Crying, laughing, sleeping—what other responses are adequate to a life that is so indifferent? “Unless a man aspires to the impossible, the possible that he achieves will scarcely be worth the trouble of his achieving it. We should aspire to the impossible, to absolute and infinite perfection [….] The apocatastasis is more than a mystical dream: it is a norm of action, it is a beacon for high deeds [….] For true charity is a species of invasion [….] It is not charity to rock and lull our fellow men to sleep in the inertia and heaviness of matter, but rather to arouse them to anguish and torment of spirit.” 3 … the impossibility of ever adequately accounting for one’s relationship to thought. “The paroxysm of interior experience leads you to regions where danger is absolute, because life which self-consciously actualizes its roots in experience can only negate itself [….] There are no arguments [….] On the heights of despair, the passion for the absurd is the only thing that can still throw a demonic light on chaos [….] I live because the mountains do not laugh and the worms do not sing .” 4 It took three attempts before she was fully decapitated, all the while she continued, perhaps miraculously, to sing. According to the earliest account of Cecilia’s martyrdom, the beheading turns out worse. After not severing her head in three strokes, “the cruel executioner left her half dead” (seminecem eam cruentus carnifex dereliquit). 5 Cecilia’s effortlessly powerful endurance of the three strokes—a fitting icon for pessimism as an art of dereliction—demonstrates the “passivity and absence of effort [….] in which divine transcendence is dissolved.” 6 There’s a ghost that grows inside of me, damaged in the making, and there’s a hunt sprung from necessity, elliptical and drowned. Where the moving quiet of our insomnia offers up each thought, there’s a luminous field of grey inertia, and obsidian dreams burnt all the way down. Like words from a pre-waking dream. There is no reason to think that they are not. NOTES 1. Dante Alighieri. Vita Nuova . ed. and trans. Dino S. Cervigni and Edward Vasta. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1995. 41:10. 2. Hafiz of Shiraz. The Divan . trans. H. Wilberforce Clarke. London: Octagon Press. 1974. 10.9. 3. Miguel de Unamuno. The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations . trans. Anthony Kerrigan. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1972. 305-6. 4. E.M. Cioran. On the Heights of Despair . trans. Ilinca Zarifopol-Johnston. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1992. 9-10. 5. Giacomo Laderchi. S. Caeciliae Virg[inis] et Mart[yris] Acta. . . Rome. 1723. 38. 6. Georges Bataille. On Nietzsche . trans. Bruce Boone. London: Continuum. 2004. 135. See Nicola Masciandaro. “ Half Dead: Parsing Cecilia .” A Commentary on Eugene Thacker’s "Cosmic Pessimism" Gary J. Shipley Pessimism is the refusal to seek distraction, the refusal to remodel failure into a platform for further (doomed) possibilities, the refusal of comfort, the acceptance of the sickness of healthy bodies, the cup of life overflowing with cold vomit. If, as Ligotti suggests when discussing Invasion of the Body Snatchers , 1 humans prefer the anxieties of their familiar human lives to the contentment of an alien one, then the pessimist, we could argue, represents some perverted combination of the two, preferring (presuming he has a choice) the defamiliarization of human life to the contentment of its unquestioned mundanity. The quasi-religious state of mind that Wittgenstein would mention on occasion, that of “feeling absolutely safe,” 2 is a state the pessimist could only imagine being approximated by death, or perhaps some annihilative opiate-induced stupor. This Wittgensteinian commingling of certainty and faith looks every bit the futile gesture, a mere rephrasing of collapse or partial collapse. The only certainty open to the pessimist is that of the toxic formula of life itself—a formula known and lacuna-free. Certainty, far from being the gateway to deliverance, becomes the definitive impediment; and the possibility of salvation, as long as it remains, becomes crucially reliant on postulations of ignorance, epistemic gaps, a perennial incompleteness: “the perfect safety of wooed death […] the warm bath of physical dissolution, the universal unknown engulfing the miniscule unknown.” 3 The height of Leibniz’s Panglossian insanity nurtured the idea that our knowing everything—via the universal calculus—could be accurately described a triumph, as opposed to a nightmare in which our every futility is laid bare. Stagnancy and boredom are perhaps two of the greatest ills of Western civilisation, and the most potent pessimism tells you that you’re stuck with both. The most we can hope for, by way of salvation, is to throw open our despair to the unknown. The fact that Schopenhauer’s pessimism stopped short of morality and allowed him to play the flute, as Nietzsche complained, highlights the predicament of a man who despite having adorned nothingness with a smiling face still found himself alive. The demand here is that it be felt: a cross-contamination of intellect and emotion. The safety net of numerous parentheses makes for a failed philosophy, rather than a philosophy of failure. Depressives make bad pessimists, because, unless they choose to die, living will always infect them with necessities of hope, forcing them to find something, anything (all the various “as ifs”) to make existence tolerable. For as Cioran observed, while “[d]epressions pay attention to life, they are the eyes of the devil, poisoned arrows which wound mortally any zest and love of life. Without them we know little, but with them, we cannot live.” 4 And even when cured of our depressions we’ll find ourselves consumed, eaten alive by the hyper-clinical (borderline autistic) mania that replaces them: a predicament captured all too clearly in the microscriptual fictions of Robert Walser, where spectral men and women stifle their depressive madness with protective comas of detail, their failed assimilations buried beneath thick crusts of remote data. Like Beckett’s Malone their stories may have ended, but cruelly their lives have not. Pessimism is an extraneous burden (a purposeless weight) that makes everything else harder to carry, while at the same time scooping it out and making it lighter. If pessimism had a sound it would be the harsh non-noise of tinnitus—the way that every person would hear themselves if they refused their distractions long enough to listen: a lungless scream from the extrasolar nothing of the self. The music of pessimism—if indeed we can imagine such a thing—is the reverberating echo of the world’s last sound, conjectured but never heard, audible only in its being listened for. The one consolation of this hollow paradox of audibility being, that “he will be least afraid of becoming nothing in death who has recognized that he is already nothing now.” 5 The pessimist suffers a derangement of the real, a labyrinthitis at the nucleus of his being: he’s the stumbling ghost relentlessly surprised that others can see him. If Cioran’s refusal is manifested in sleep (when even saying ‘no’ is too much of a commitment), then Pessoa’s resides in the dreams inside that sleep. Pessoa chooses to exploit the fact that he’s being “lived by some murmuring non-entity both shadowy and muddied” 6 by growing more voids to live him. His is a Gnostic breed of sleep, “sleeping as if the universe were a mistake,” 7 a sleep that dreams through Thacker’s cosmic pessimism (“a pessimism of the world-without-us.”, “the unhuman orientation of deep space and deep time” 8 ), through the critical error of there being anything at all when there could be nothing. The metaphysical pessimist is someone who, however well life treats them, still desires to wake from it, as from the poisonous air of a bad dream. Pessimism is a paradox of age, being simultaneously young and old; its youth residing in a refusal to accept the authority of existence (its rich history, its inherent beneficence), a refusal to “get over” the horror of what it sees with its perpetually fresh eyes, and its maturity in the unceremonious disposal of the philosophical playthings (those futile architectures) of adolescence. As Thacker remarks: “Pessimism abjures all pretenses towards system—towards the purity of analysis and the dignity of critique.” 9 A sentiment shared with Pessoa, who duly categorizes those that choose to enact this futile struggle: “The creators of metaphysical systems and of psychological explanations are still in the primary stage of suffering.” 10 If the pessimist has shared a womb with anyone, it’s with the mystic and not the philosopher. As Schopenhauer tells us: “The mystic is opposed to the philosopher by the fact that he begins from within, whereas the philosopher begins from without. […] But nothing of this is communicable except the assertions that we have to accept on his word; consequently he is unable to convince.” 11 The crucial difference between the mystic and the pessimist is not the latter’s impassivity and defeatism, but his unwillingness/inability to contain in any way the spread of his voracious analyticity, his denial of incompleteness, his exhaustive devotion to failure. The truth of our predicament, though heard, is destined to remain unprocessed. Like the revelations of B.S. Johnson’s Haakon (“We rot and there’s nothing that can stop it / Can’t you feel the shaking horror of that?” 12 ) the pessimist’s truths are somehow too obvious to listen to, as if something inside us were saying, “Of course, but haven’t we gotten over that?” Pessimism is simple and ugly, and has no desire to make itself more complex or more attractive. The true moral pessimist knows that the Utilitarian’s accounts will always be in the red. He can see that for all his computational containments, his only honest path is a negative one, and that such a path has but one logical destination: that of wholesale human oblivion. Thacker notes how at the core of pessimism lies the notion of “the worst,” through which death is demoted by the all-pervasive suffering of a life that easily eclipses its threat. And so with doom made preferable to gloom, death begins to glint with promise, “like beauty passing through a nightmare.” 13 But even among pessimists suicide is, for the most part, thought to be an error. Schopenhauer, for instance, regarded suicide a mistake grounded in some fundamentally naïve disappointment or other. Pessoa too thought suicide an onerous escape tactic: “To die is to become completely other. That’s why suicide is a cowardice: it’s to surrender ourselves completely to life.” 14 There is a call here to be accepting of and creative with the puppetry of your being, an insistence that it’s somehow a blunder to attempt to hide in death from the horrors you find inlife. 15 Tied up with this perseverance is the slippery notion of the good death, for maybe, as Blanchot warns, suicide is rarely something we can hope to get right, for the simple reason that “you cannot make of death an object of the will.” 16 “Even in cases where the entire corpus of an author is pessimistic, the project always seems incomplete,” 17 and this is not simply because the project itself belies something yet to be disclosed, but because the project itself is a thing waiting. It waits on a cure it knows will not come, but for which it cannot do anything (as long as it continues to do anything) but wait. NOTES 1. See Thomas Ligotti. The Conspiracy Against the Human Race . New York: Hippocampus Press. 2010. 91. 2. Ludwig Wittgenstein. “A Lecture on Ethics.” Philosophical Review . (74) 1. 1965. 8. 3. Vladimir Nabokov. Pale Fire . New York: Vintage. 1989. 221. 4. E. M. Cioran. The Book of Delusions . trans. Camelia Elias. Hyperion. 5.1. (2010): 75. 5. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Representation. vol. 2 . trans. E .F J. Payne. New York: Dover. 1966. 609. 6. Eugene Thacker. “Cosmic Pessimism.” continent. . 2.2 (2012): 67. 7. Fernando Pessoa. The Book of Disquiet . trans. Richard Zenith. London: Penguin. 2002. 35. 8. Eugene Thacker. “Cosmic Pessimism.” continent. . 2.2 (2012): 68. 9. Ibid. 73. 10. Fernando Pessoa. The Book of Disquiet . trans. Richard Zenith. London: Penguin. 2002. 341. 11. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Representation. vol. 2 . trans. E .F J. Payne. New York: Dover. 1966. 610-11. 12. B.S Johnson. “You’re Human Like the Rest of Them.” in Jonathan Coe. Like a Fiery Elephant: The Story of B.S. Johnson . London: Picador. 2004. 177. 13. Fernando Pessoa. The Book of Disquiet . trans. Richard Zenith. London: Penguin. 2002. 415. 14. Ibid. 199. 15. “Suicide is, after all, the opposite of the poem.” Anne Sexton. No Evil Star: Selected Essays, Interviews and Prose . ed. Steven Gould Axelrod. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1985. 92. 16. Maurice Blanchot. The Space of Literature . trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1989. 105. 17. Eugene Thacker. “Cosmic Pessimism.” continent. . 2.2 (2012): 75. (shrink)

This paper interprets the philosophical and poetic legacy of Dante Alighieri in the context of the crises he experienced in his life. Dante went through the number of experiences during his lifetime which were significant to his understanding of himself and the world. Such a very personal trial he had to deal with was his unrequited love for Beatrice Portinari, and, especially, her death at a young age. In addition, a very difficult period in his life was (...) his political activity and public service in his native Florence, which led to his entanglement in the conflict between the factions of Guelphs and Ghibellines, and to his exile from Florence which lasted until the end of his life. These events can be described as “the crises” of the Florentine poet, because they were the turning points in his life, which required him to make some important decisions. The word “crisis”, according to its Greek etymology, signifies the decision making process which changes the way of thinking and the style of living. In this article, a thesis is proposed that Alighieri’s work can be interpreted and understood as an expression of the crises he was going through, but above all, as the way of coming out of crisis, which is expressed by taking thoughtful existential decisions. The Italian poet was also an excellent philosopher, as evidenced by his philosophical treatises and poetic works, for he was able to combine the principles of medieval scholastic philosophy with his poetry. Philosophy also played a significantly positive role in his life and contributed to his hopeful and optimistic worldview and perception of man, what constitutes the fundamental and timeless message of his work. (shrink)

Dante’s engagement with philosophy cannot be studied apart from his vocation as a writer, in which he sought to raise the level of public discourse by educating his countrymen and inspiring them to pursue happiness in the contemplative life. He was one of the most learned Italian laymen of his day, intimately familiar with Aristotelian logic and natural philosophy, theology, and classical literature. He is, of course,most famous for having written the Divine Comedy, but in his poetry as well (...) as his philosophical treatises and other writings, he freely mingles and synthesizes philosophical and theological language as well extensive references and allusions to scripture and classical and contemporary poetry. While his contributions to world literature and other artistic genres are universally acknowledged, his theological imagination has also remained influential from his own time to the present day. His philosophical legacy, by comparison, remains more difficult to assess, though his writings provide, at the very least, a powerful tool for the study of the landscape of late medieval and Renaissance philosophy. (shrink)

Lo storico della filosofia e filosofo francese Étienne Gilson (1884-1978) ha notoriamente offerto una lettura innovativa di importanti figure del pensiero medievale, da Tommaso d’Aquino a Duns Scoto e Bonaventura, includendo in questa lista anche Agostino di Ippona. L’originalità della lettura offerta da Gilson si esprime per lo meno in due modi. In primo luogo, Gilson ha argomentato a sostegno dell’effettiva caratura filosofica, e non semplicemente teologica, del pensiero di quei pensatori. Contro un pesante pregiudizio che all’epoca in cui egli (...) iniziava le sue ricerche, e specialmente nella sua Francia, gravava nei confronti della cultura medioevale – di non aver espresso alcuna filosofia ma solo una teologia – egli acquisì «il merito di aver non solo iniziato genialmente la riscoperta della filosofia medievale, ma di aver decisamente contribuito a riportarne la storia ai livelli della scientificità e della dignità accademica». In secondo luogo, Gilson ha sostenuto che la filosofia in questione si caratterizza di uno «spirito cristiano» che, come aveva caratterizzato l’epoca medievale sotto ogni altro aspetto, ne aveva informato il pensiero filosofico, dando vita a una vera e propria «filosofia cristiana». Ma se questo significa che, per il filosofo francese, si dava un elemento di caratterizzazione unitaria del pensiero medievale, va anche rilevato che, per lo stesso autore, questo pensiero andava indagato nella sua notevole varietà. Con competenza e lettura fedele dei testi, Gilson valorizzò le differenze tra le filosofie dei vari autori presi in considerazione. In questo articolo, intendo mostrare che queste due caratteristiche dell’interpretazione gilsoniana del pensiero medievale si applicano entrambe all’interpretazione che il filosofo francese offrì del pensiero di Dante Alighieri. In primo luogo, Gilson ha riconosciuto anche a Dante, come al pensiero medievale tutto, una caratura specificamente filosofica. In secondo luogo, della filosofia del sommo poeta (che Gilson riteneva anch’essa ‘cristiana’) ha evidenziato la peculiarità, sganciandola dalle classificazioni che la volevano ridurre a qualcuna delle correnti filosofiche del Duecento. Il fine che mi propongo è quello di mostrare (nella prima sezione) in che cosa consista questa peculiarità, per poi procedere (nelle successive tre sezioni) a rilevare che essa conduce Gilson a una coerente interpretazione di Dante filosofo secondo tre direttrici: quella etica, quella politica e quella filosofico-storica. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest przybliżenie powstania oddziału Towarzystwa „Dante Alighieri” we Lwowie w 1929 r., źródłowego. U podstaw zainicjowania działania towarzystwa leżały inspiracje kulturowe oparte na polsko-włoskich relacjach towarzyskich pomiędzy konsulem Włoch w Katowicach, Ferrucciem de Luppis, a rodziną Adama i Janiny de Lambert Ebenbergerów, które zostaną przybliżone w artykule. Istotną rolę w tym względzie odegrały także osoby związane z Uniwersytetem Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie, w którego murach – dzięki zaangażowaniu prof. Edmunda Bulandy – towarzystwo znalazło swoją siedzibę.

Celem artykułu jest przybliżenie powstania oddziału Towarzystwa „Dante Alighieri” we Lwowie w 1929 r., źródłowego. U podstaw zainicjowania działania towarzystwa leżały inspiracje kulturowe oparte na polsko-włoskich relacjach towarzyskich pomiędzy konsulem Włoch w Katowicach, Ferrucciem de Luppis, a rodziną Adama i Janiny de Lambert Ebenbergerów, które zostaną przybliżone w artykule. Istotną rolę w tym względzie odegrały także osoby związane z Uniwersytetem Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie, w którego murach – dzięki zaangażowaniu prof. Edmunda Bulandy – towarzystwo znalazło swoją siedzibę.

Este trabajo presenta con bastante detalle y examina críticamente las posturas historiográficas de dos intelectuales que vivieron en la primera mitad del siglo XX: Francesco Ercole y Bruno Nardi. Estos intelectuales italianos, especialistas en el pensamiento de Dante Alighieri y en particular en su filosofía política, desarrollaron sus respectivos análisis estudiando la articulación entre dos conceptos esenciales en la elaboración de las teorías políticas que surgieron entre el siglo XIII y XIV en el Occidente Latino. En efecto, esas (...) nociones son “naturaleza” y “fin”. Uno de los objetivos de este artículo es mostrar que, en el marco de la teoría política presentada por Dante en Monarchia y Convivio, la operatividad de estas ideas resulta fundamental para definir en qué consiste la autonomía de una comunidad respecto de los poderes políticos con los que se relaciona. (shrink)